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AD 394023

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1ST DIVISION 10180 WASHINGTON D.C.  
110-57-96247

- 10 -

**Subject:** Combat Operations / After Action Report, Operation NEWTHORNS (COC: HQC-12-22)

22 יונ

TIN: Commanding General  
I Field Force Vietnam  
US Forces 93240

To: Commanding General  
US Military Assistance  
ATTN: J343  
AFG US Forces 96243

⑥ Operations Hawthorne.  
Headquarters, 1st Brigade  
1st Artillery

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation WILDFIRE. JULY 1966

2. (U) Dates of Operation: 2 June thru 20 June 1966.

3. (U) Location: KONTUM Province. (18) OACSFOR

4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization: 19 OT-RD-66X102

b. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation "TETRAPI" is shown below. This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation, with the following exceptions: (1) 1/5 Cav and 1 1/2 Cav came under the operational control of the 1st Brigade on 10 and 8 June 1968 respectively, and (2) CTM military and paramilitary forces were attached or under operational coordination with the 1st Brigade during various phases of the operation. The CT units are listed below in paragraph 6b.

T3-1/237

The Troops

1/227 Inf  
32/320 Arty  
Demo Th A 326 Engr

III C (-)  
A 2/17 Cav  
A 32<sup>nd</sup> Inf (-)

F-2/503

2/502 Inf  
C 2/320 Art'y  
Demo Tn A 326 Engr  
IP<sup>1</sup> Tn  
EAC

MF PANT (-)  
1/101 Inv Soc  
20 Chem Det  
ME-1 245 Inv Ops Co  
181 MM Det  
3 DPMU

2/320 Artv (-)

3 1/30irty

Snt. ၃၈ (-)

FOR OT RD  
66X102 ✓

4tr (-)  
/30 4rty  
n (-)

DUANE S. MCKEEAN  
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KHAB-C

22 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MANTICORE (ARVN 101st ARVN)

b. During Operation MANTICORE, the 1st Ranger Bn (ARVN) and 1st Ranger Bn (ARVN) were in close and continuous contact with the 1st Brigade throughout mutual coordination between the 1st Ranger Bn (ARVN), 1st Airborne Div (ARVN) and the 1st Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (ARVN). Through additional coordination, the 1st Battalion, 101st Airborne Division and one "D" company were integrated into the brigade under command of commander. These ARVN units served as heavier elements, protected main supply lines, provided convoy security, protected artillery batteries and zig-zag defences, and screened flanks of attacking units. In addition, ten (10) Apache Patrels provided information from long range patrols conducted in the RVN.

c. TF 2/327 Inf remained "active" from the 1st Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) in RVN "C" on Operation "TIGER HALE".

7. (S) Supporting Forces:

a. 3/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

b. D 1/30 (C-47): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 10th Army Aviation Battalion: Provided helicopter support forirmobile assaults throughout the operation. In addition, the unit flew daily resupply missions and provided aerial helicopter support for the operation.

d. 147th Avn Co: Provided general support with five CH-47 helicopters.

e. 218th Avn Co: Provided direct support with five O-2 aircraft.

f. 5th Air Commando Squadron provided airlift support for Psy War Ops..

g. 245th Psy Ops Co provided one loudspeaker team and one leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

i. C-12A: flew 306 tactical air missions for ARVN combat. The results of these missions include 16 T-54 (P), 33 T-34 (Pst), 29 T-55 (P), 10 B-52 (P), 10 armoured vehicles, 10 machine weapons sites destroyed, 10 buildings destroyed, 100% secondary explosions.

j. Strategic Air Command, USAF: flew two B-52 missions for 36 sorties in support of the operation. These missions resulted in 22 T-54 (P) and 200 T-34 (Pst).

j. 420th Medical Battalion (Airmobile): Provided continuous medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (U) Mission: Headquarters, 1 Field Force Vietnam, Airborne, the 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division, conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of RVN 70, RVN 70A, RVN 69 and assist in the withdrawal of the RVN IDON Regional Force outpost.

10. (U) General Operations: Operation MANTICORE was conducted in two phases. See Inclosure 3, 4, and 4 A, Operations Overlays.

a. Phase I (2 June - 6 June 1966): This phase consisted of a three-pronged converging attack by the 1/327 Inf, the 1st Ranger Bn (ARVN) and the 1/2 1st Regt (ARVN) to relieve the besieged Regional Force outpost at RVN MORONG.

2

MORONG.

(10, 14 P)

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22 July 1951

AIRDOC  
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FAIRWIND (23-100)  
J3-2)

b. During the G Jack - A Jack mission, the 1st Cavalry and 10th Cavalry enveloped the enemy located in the northern portion of the "W" by the 1/27 Inf and 1/30 Inf. Subsequently, the 1st Cavalry (ARVN), B 1/30 Inf and 1/5 Cav were inserted in an attempt to encircle the enemy, then identified as the 24th NVA Regt. A massive bombardment was then delivered on 13 June 1951. Following the D-6 strike, an exploitation by a mobile and ground attack was launched, and a counter-attack and destroy operation was conducted through 20 June.

- Tex Merrell

II. (C) Description:

a. The brigade (A) began its movement from the RVN "W" area by C-130 aircraft on 20 May 1951 and arrived into RVN "W" on 3 June 1951. A total of 201 sorties were utilized. On 3 June 1951, the 2/302 Inf disembarked from RVN "W" to RVN "C" by C-130 aircraft and convoy.

b. From 3-6 June 1951, the 1/27 Inf Regt ("W") began an attack north along "W" Hwy 14 toward RVN "C". It was encountered an enemy force of an estimated one battalion size. On 4 June 1951, the 1/307 Inf and 1st Cavalry Da ("W") conducted a mobile assault west to the south. This three-pronged converging attack was intended to relieve the besieged friendly forces outpost at RVN 10000C. To insure the uninterrupted advance of the 1/27 Inf Regt ("W") after it was attacked on 1 June and to provide artillery support for the 1/327 Inf, a 105 mm howitzer battery and a rifle company were lifted by helicopter aboard of the 1/42 Inf Regt ("W") along the "W" Battalion's axis of advance. This force became lightly engaged on the evening of 3 and 4 June having landed just to the west of the "W" force in contact with the 1/42 Inf Regt ("W"). On 5 June 1951, the three battalions converged on RVN 10000C with the 1/327 Inf securing the terrain northeast of the RVN 10000C outpost and the 1/42 Inf Regt ("W") and 21st Ranger Battalion ("W") landing in and off to the relief of the garrison. Without further incident, the RVN 10000C garrison was withdrawn and returned mid-afternoon of 6 June 1951 to the vicinity of RVN 70 along with the 1/42 Inf Regt ("W") and the 21st Ranger Battalion ("W"). The 1/327 Inf remained at RVN 10000C and the supporting 105 mm howitzer battery and the rifle company in security remained in the valley few kilometers to the west of RVN 10000C.

c. Three PM: The evening of 6 June 1951, the 1/27 Inf made night contact with the enemy, and early in morning of 7 June 1951 the artillery battery and defensive rifle company were heavily attacked with mortars fire, from 100, 120, 160 mm mortars by the 24th Regt. The fight lasted until 0400 hours when the RVN forces withdrew under friendly fire casualties. On 7 June 1951, the 1/327 Inf attacked and in the assault, met no serious resistance. At this time, the 2/302 Inf was released as 1 RVN "C" reserve and for directly deployed to an objective south to relieve the garrison northern flank. From 7 through 10 June 1951, because of the "W" side the enemy almost continuously as the 1/327 Inf and 2/302 Inf sought to dislodge the RVN forces from entrenched positions in the Son La bridge area. The RVN "C" company was released from the 1/327 Inf at RVN "C" and was inserted into the bridge in support to the 1st Inf escor patrols. The 1/5 Cav was also deployed to the Son La bridge, 1st Cavalry Da (ARVN) on 13 June 1951 and together with the 2/302 Inf secured their positions along the northern and southern banks to be the enemy front 10000C orfiltration route. The 1/27 Inf and 1/327 Inf were available to the 24th Tactical Zone Commander and helilifted when the situation called for. With to complete the encirclement of the 24th Regt, on 14 June 1951, one volunteer provisional rifle company, recruited by 1st Cavalry Da from their personnel at RVN 10000C, were helilifted into the area to join the fight. Pressure was brought to bear on the enemy on all sides. As the rear, right in location of the enemy force became clear, a decision was made to request a B-52 strike on the "W" side. The strike was requested for 0000 hours 17 June 1951 to provide time to evacuate friendly forces and re-occupy front line positions behind the three

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AWB-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation TIGER HUNT (USARFOR J3-32)

22 July 1968

Heliporter safety line. An option to utilize one of three support planes developed to keep the team engaged until 1300 hours 16 June 1968. The 1/1 Inf battalion was repositioned to the south of the safety line to block possible enemy infiltration. During direct attacks on the strike, 1000 US troops were dropped into the vicinity of the target area, covering about one square kilometer. Between 0600 and 0745 hours 13 June 1968, the B-52 strike was launched precisely on target. Following the initial ground assault and exploitation, the 1/227 Inf, 2/502 Inf, 1/3 Cav, 1/102 Inf (A Co) and 3779 elements immediately exploited the objective area by helicopter and ground movement. Thirty minutes following the B-52 strike, one rifle company from 1/102 Inf has been airlifted into the B-52 target area. Large numbers of VC WIA, weapons and equipment were found in the area. The 2/502 Inf has also captured 15 dead VNA personnel. On 15 June 1968, the 2/502 Inf and 1/3 Cav engaged a sizeable force north of the B-52 strike and the enemy broke contact following tactical air strikes. In the final phase of the operation, the 1/5 Cav conducted the valley northwest of the strike area and swept southeast to pick up enemy stragglers. On 17 June 1968, the 1/227 Inf made an all sweep around the south of TIGER HUNT with expectations of overrunning an enemy hospital. Neither operations produced any significant contact.

## 12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division succeeded in its mission to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces in the DAK TO, TAN CANG and TAN HOA areas.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation TIGER HUNT:

## (1) Personnel losses:

479	VC WIA (D)
506	VC KIA (D)
52	VC KIA (D)
239	VC KIA (EST)
10	VC WIA (EST)
22	VC KIA
0	VC KIA

## (2) Weapons Captured:

ITEM	QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER
M-16	2	US
M-72	1	US
Mauser "90" Rifle	2	German
Luger, 9mm, Pistol	1	German
SIG Carbine	19	Swiss
AK-47	51	Chinese
Barrele'd' Pistol	1	Chinese
RPG-2 Rocket Launcher	13	Chinese
12.7mm Barrels & Sight	2	Chinese
RPG 70	8	Chinese
7.62mm FOWARD' Pistol	1	Russian
Rifle	11	Unknown

Total 112

## (3) Ammunition:

ITEM	QUANTITY
12.7mm	3,000 rds
82mm Mortar	35 rds
75mm	3 rds

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WILD-C

SIGHTING: Combat Operations after action report, operation N. IVAN (223;  
17 Nov 1966)

22 July 1966

ITEM	SIZE
M-16	100 lbs
Drago. Min.	10,000 lbs

## (4) Aircraft destroyed:

ITEM	SIZE
UH-1H	20 ft x 10 ft
Cessna 172	300 ft
Field Trainer (Cessna)	2

## (5) Explosives:

ITEM	SIZE
T-6 - 10' block	100
Claymore Mines (Caisson)	2
Land Mines	1
Han' Gren. (box)	102

## (6) Clothing:

ITEM	SIZE
Pants	40
Shirts	75
Shoes	10 pr

## (7) Dead:

ITEM	SIZE
"Dead"	22 tons

## (8) Material captured:

ITEM	SIZE
Belts (for 100 men)	5
Food, rice, drugs, pills, surgical equipment	Numerous

## (9) Miscellaneous:

ITEM	SIZE
Load Bearing Equipment	57
Log blocks	83
Entrenching Tool	23
Bicycle	13

## (10) Corps Destroyed:

ITEM	SIZE
ZD151340	Company to Battalion
ZD10371	Company
ZD12949	Company
ZD120370	Battalion
ZD133345	Battalion

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ANID-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations Plan Action 10001, Operation UNTIL (US: NCOV J3-32)

22 July 1966

(11) AV Positions (Interim): G.

13. (3) Administrative Actions:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 5, Logistics.

14. (3) Special Techniques and Techniques:

a. M-79 mortar round: The conventional high explosive M-79 round was found to have limited value in the thick bamboo jungles, since the round could not penetrate the undergrowth. The XM762 mortar round for the M-79 Grenade Launcher, however, proved to be highly effective in penetrating the bamboo. The shot pattern at 100 yards provides an extremely high number of first-round kills. The use of this round together with the 60mm Mortar was effective in discouraging "hugging" tactics of the enemy in dense jungle.

b. D-52 target acquisition: Handing the acquisition of the D-52 target with airborne assault following a strike proved difficult. It enabled the assaulting unit to capture the surviving enemy before they had a chance to escape to the rear. The search of the target area must be systematic. Adequate search time must be allocated to permit uncovering the maximum number of enemy weapons and equipment. Diving may be required since the enemy may have hastily attempted to hide equipment.

c. Demolitions: Detonating charges are more effective than F1T or C-4 for the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and caches. Although detonating charges are awkward and not easily transportable by foot mobile elements, the charge is very stable and can easily be delivered to an area by employing free-fall techniques from a hovering helicopter.

d. CH-47 "piggy-back" loads: Airlifting of artillery units by CH-47 helicopters can be simplified through the use of "piggy-back" sling loads. This technique reduces the time and number of sorties required.

15. (3) Improvised Armoring:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Pararescue operators: The addition of a Pararescue operator to the POC at brigade level would assist in gathering and disseminating timely information. They would be useful in obtaining accurate reports, intelligence and logistic information. Pararescue operators could also be effectively used in Parachute drops before ever tries to take live-life pictures of soldiers to be used on specialized news nets.

(2) Supply of attached CIDG units: New CIDG personnel are armed with either the caliber .45 M61 V-3 or 20mm or .30 Carbine and provisions must be made for having such ammunition immediately available for resupply. CIDG personnel prefer to be given fish and rice (their normal diet) rather than C-rations. These are resupply sorties should be handled through Special Forces advisers and not by direct resupply by the Brigade S-4.

(3) Helicopter winch systems: Many missions require the use of helicopters with a winch capability. The hoist on the UH-1D med-evac needs to be modified to increase its reliability. The hoist of the CH-47 is adequate but is too slow for personnel extraction. The hoist of the Marine Corps CH-46

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22 July 1966

AMMO  
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WITTY (OPS: 116CV J3-32)

is always to be available. However, we believe the CH-47 is the best choice by 10 blo. Air Force CH-47 helicopters are not always available and only on a mission basis. Consideration should be given to upgrading the CH-47 to the CH-43 helicopters until the CH-43 is available to provide reliable extraction.

- (4) Assignment of utility aircraft to the Infantry Battalion: It has been found useful to attach two UH-1D helicopters, when availability permits, to each of the Infantry Battalions for use under the direct control of the battalion commander. The assignment of these utility helicopters can provide the command flexibility for resupply, liaison, medical evacuation and small unit troop movements.

(5) Construction and improvement of landing zones: The absence of natural landing zones is a serious problem in dense terrain. A more systematic and faster method of clearing and expanding landing zones must be established. The attachment of engineer LZ clearing squads to each assaulting battalion has proved effective.

(6) Tactical air and artillery support: Continuous and simultaneous artillery and tactical air support of the fire target area continues to be a problem. A possible solution would be to have an AN/FRT-24 radio in the artillery FDC and to have an artillery FO accompanying the FIC. The FO would be equipped with an AN/TG-25 radio. This would provide continuous communications between the artillery FDC, FIC, MC's and fighter pilots and thus permit direct coordination.

(7) Flame throwers: Flame throwers have been found to be too cumbersome to be carried by soldiers maneuvering by foot in dense jungle terrain. Flame throwers should be turned into the objective area as required. Support Battalion with the assistance of the 23d Ordnance Detachment has been given the responsibility for maintaining three portable flame throwers in a ready, charged state to be issued to the using unit on short notice.

(8) POW's: In Operation WITTY, prisoners were not captured until late in the operation. Individual soldiers must be impressed with the importance of capturing prisoners. They are inclined to be too quick on the trigger.

(9) Psychological Warfare:

(a) One school trained Psychological Warfare officer should be assigned to the Brigade. Additionally, a small Psy Ops detachment with the capability of printing, packaging and delivering leaflets should be attached to the Brigade. This would increase the efficiency of Psy Ops in the Brigade and would reduce the time required to accomplish a mission.

(b) The split responsibility between the Army and the Air Force at Brigade level creates a problem. The ground tactical commander should have control of all Psy War activities in order that they be immediately responsive to the changing situation.

(c) Consideration should be given to establishing a US or FAU POW Control which would insure treatment of prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Such an effort should be publicized and extensively to include all news media, leaflets and broadcasts.

b. Highlights of Operation:

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22 July 1965

U.S. ARMY: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "WIGWAM" (OAS: HAWK J3-32)

(1) Maintenance of Logistic Support: Continuous contact was maintained with the command area by the air force of 6 June until the screening forces broke contact with them. Following this strike, contact was reestablished while maintaining fuel and supplies for several days thereafter.

(2) Fire power: The Brigade employed the equivalent of 1,6 MT of air and artillery ordnance (MT, RVN round of artillery). Of the 499 air sorties, 130 were "sign spot". It is believed that the RVN was dealt a psychological blow to its cohesion effectively by employing close air support around the clock. The Arc Light strikes is considered to have been an outstanding example of the use of the B-52 in a close support role.

(3) Maneuver: The double envelopment, with major forces attacking the enemy from the south and north, together with massive use of fire power, is the most successful tactic we have employed. This was the same tactic employed so successfully in the past at WIGWAM in Operation AUSTIN 6. Rapid exploitation of B-52 strikes by an armchair operation in the center of the target area was effective.

(4) Operation with ARVN Forces: In addition to Major ARVN forces, the Brigade was assisted by nine ARVN companies, one Regional Forces company, and one ARVN scout company. Ten APC's, three were also employed. The Special Forces A Co. 7 Ton's in Kontum Province are considered to be the most effective, responsive, and proactive encountered in operations in eight provinces during the past six months. The 1st Army Jeffords are an outstanding group.

(5) Armor: The armor proved to be disciplined, well-trained, courageous fighters. Excellent camouflage, field fortifications, and battlefield police were demonstrated. One weakness noticed was a lack of flexibility. The attempted ambush of the ARVN battalion on 3 June was practically a repeat of the operation last year.

(6) Psychological Operations: The initial support was weak but gradually improved. A total of six million leaflets were dropped and 24 hours of low-speed fire time was utilized. Four CH-47 HOH helicopters were directly committed to the broadcasts.

(7) Mobility: During the operation nearly 15,000 passengers were moved in 53atable assault were made; eight of the assaults were of battalion size. In addition, seven artillery batteries were moved into firing position to support the operation.

16. (c) Recommendations:

- a. That consideration be given to establishing and publicizing a US or ARVN Prisoner of War Committee.
- b. That the manufacture and issue of the XM57GP round for the M-79 and the one-shot flares thrower be expedited.
- c. That the hoists on the CH-47 and CH-46 helicopters be modified to increase reliability and speed of operation.
- d. That Polaroid cameras be included in the CO's at Brigade level for use in psychological operations and investigations.
- e. That the Brigade be provided with one school trained Psychological

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AMMO-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations Area Action Report, Operation LANTERNER (DS: 1103) (See)

Warfare Officer, 2d Inf Div, 1st PIR, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, "MacDivinitus", packaging and delivery.

22 July 1966

*Specified Period*  
AMMO-C  
Divisional Artillery  
Division Artillery, USA  
C-1103-111

Definitions:

- 1 - Personnel
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Electronic Countermeasures
- 4 - Mortars, Mortarable Projectiles
- 5 - Artillery
- 6 - Gun
- 7 - Mortar
- 8 - Gun Mortar
- 9 - Mortar Mortar
- 10 - Mortar Gun

Definitions:

- 1 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 2 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 3 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 4 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 5 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 6 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 7 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 8 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 9 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army
- 10 - 1st Lt, 1st Cdo, 1st Inf Div, 1st ABCT, 1st AD, 1st MAW, 1st MAW, Division Artillery, Dept of the Army

- 11 - Sig
- 12 - Log

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Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation HAWTHORNE.

1. (C) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5240
Joined not assigned	116
Present for Duty	5252
Not Present for Duty	472
Air Head Strength	248
Base Camp	193
Tuy Hoa	1401

(2) The assigned strength was 130% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5249
Joined not assigned	115
Present for Duty	4703
Not Present for Duty	931
Air Head Strength	2431
Base Camp	1527
Tuy Hoa	755

(2) The assigned was 129% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 421 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, CCNUS, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.

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## Inclosure 1 (contd)

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (WCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively enlisting them in the "roline".

(3) WCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the training areas.

## 2. (C) Casualties:

## a. Casualties for Operation HAWTHORN were as follows:

UNIT	KIA	MIA
1/327	1	135
2/327	1	71
2/328	4	24
A/326	1	6
C/327	2	2
D/327	1	1
TOTAL	9	239

## b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

KIA	222
WIA	1207
TOTAL	2

## 3. (C) Personnel Reassessments:

a. A total of 201 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakdown of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

1/327	11
2/327	171
2/328	22

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical LOS were assigned as follows:

Plat Ldr	11
Plat Sgts	10
Doctors	2
Med Spec Ass'ts	2
Logistics	1

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical LOS shortage were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.

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Inclosure 1 (contd)

4. (U) Personnel Services: HQ, Finance, SJA, and American Red Cross representatives visited the forward area and provided assistance. The brigade has received an additional US field representative which will provide extended service.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

1. (C) Terrain: The area of operation consisted of mountainous terrain rising to heights of 2300 meters. The vegetation, varying between open forest with heavy undergrowth and rain forest with a dense jungle canopy, limited observation and fields of fire, while providing excellent cover and concealment. Highway 14 was the principal north-south avenue of approach, while well defined trails (NB 000670 to NB 106650, NB 000620 to ZB 100650, YB 810150 to AS 830160) provided the principal east-west avenues. The terrain favored enemy infiltration operations by providing concealment from aerial observation and restricted our operations with a lack of landing zones.

2. (U) Weather: The southwest monsoon dominated the weather, although there was less rain and cloudiness than expected. High winds occurred infrequently, but low cloud conditions and rain began late each afternoon and lasted until early the following morning. The weather limited serial activity and restricted visibility during early morning hours when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and movement from aerial observation.

3. (C) At the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE, the following information was available regarding enemy activity:

a. Major VC infiltration routes crossed the Cambodian and Laotian borders in this area.

b. Three NVA soldiers at DAK TO, who said they were platoon leaders in the 88th NVA Regiment, reported their unit to be at YB 7845 with a reconnaissance element at TAN CHAU (18 May 1966) preparing for an attack on that village.

c. A soldier from the 4th Bn. 24th NVA Regiment reported his battalion at ZB 012332.

d. A captured diary disclosed VC plans of another NVA B.I.M. ... PAVN somewhere in the highlands, with the main axis in KONTUM Province.

e. Other information led to the belief that one battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment was north of TOU MORONG (ZB 135354) and two battalions were southwest of TOU MORONG (ZB 1225).

f. TOU MORONG had received sporadic small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar harassing attacks from the north from 22 May to 26 May 1966.

4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through front line contact.

a. Enemy prisoners and documents gave the identification of engaged units as the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment.

b. The enemy was located by moving units into the TOU MORONG area after an artillery outpost had been attacked on the morning of 7 June 1966. This front line contact was the principal source of information about the enemy's location from 7 June until the end of the operation.

5. (C) Results:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior to the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne division in the DAK TO area, it was believed that two NVA Regiments were preparing for an attack on the TOU MORONG outpost.

(2) Soldiers and prisoners indicated that those units were the 24th and 88th NVA Regiments. Soldiers indicated that the 24th was located in the immediate TOU MORONG area and the 88th was located in Laos.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

(3) Total enemy strength in the area of interest was estimated to be 4000 NVA personnel and 2400 Viet Cong local force and guerrilla personnel.

(4) Initial enemy dispositions:

UNIT	LOCATIONS	STRENGTH	DATE	SUMMARY
24th NVA Regt	VIC TOU MONHONG	2000	-	Uncnf Prob
U/I Bn 24th Reg ZB 123?		400	26 May	Uncnf Prob
2 U/I Bns				
24th Regt	ZB 1225	800	26 May	Uncnf Prob
88th NVA Regt	ZB 7625	1700	22 May	Uncnf Probs
200 NVA Bn (NF)	ZB 9333	300	29 May	Confirmed
304 Bn (NF)	ZB 2326	210	29 May	Confirmed
8-10 LF Cos	Scattered	300	-	-
Guerrillas	Scattered	2100	-	-

b. OB Summary and Findings:

(1) Units identified by POW's:

(a) 24th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div

4th Bn Ccs 1, 2, 3  
5th Bn, Ccs 6, 7, 8, & 10  
6th Bn, Ccs 11, 12, & 13  
17th Combat Support Co  
15th Eng Co  
20th Med Evac Co  
21st AS Co  
22d Trans Co

3

(2) Units identified by documents:

K5 - 5th Bn 24th NVA Regt  
Cong Truong 24 - Worksite 24 ~ 24th NVA Regt  
Cong Truong 6 - Agricultural Site 6  
H-1  
C-26  
K3-1  
K3-5  
I-A  
TV - Unit called TV Compound

(3) POW's stated that a major base complex and the 304th Div HQ was located in Tacent, Laos where the regiment stayed for approximately one month before entering South Vietnam.

(4) The mission of the 24th Regt was to attack DIK TO and TOU MONHONG and ambush NVA relief forces. Soldiers from the 24th and 88th Regts stated that the 88th was to coordinate with the 24th Regt in these attacks.

(5) In engagements with the 24th NVA Regt in the TOU MONHONG vicinity between 9 and 13 June 1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division rendered this NVA Unit ineffective as a combat force. Casualties to the 24th Regt were 1231 killed by body count and estimate. It is probable that it will be several months before the unit can obtain replacements and again become effective as a combat unit.

(6) Morale of the NVA troops is reported to be low as a result of the extreme difficulties encountered during infiltration, lack of medical supplies, lack of food, high malaria rate, and fear of friendly air attacks and artillery fire.

(7) Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 2 lists the final order of battle of enemy forces in KONTUM Province.

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Incl. sure 2 (Intelligence) to Contact Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

(8) Incl. sure 2 to Incl. sure 2 gives the composition, disposition and strength of the 24th NVA Regt.

c. VC personnel and equipment losses are shown in paragraph 12b to the basic After Action Report.

6. Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) The DMZ TC, TON LUNG, DMZ SUT area is a major VC base area as indicated by the degree of resistance and nature of defenses found.

(2) The VC planned a major offensive in the DMZ TC, TON LUNG, DMZ SUT area as indicated by their abortive attack of 7 June 1966 as well as the aggressive actions of their units on 9, 10 and 11 June.

(3) The VC plan in the DMZ TC, TON LUNG, DMZ SUT area has been set back as indicated by the fifty percent or more casualties taken by the 24th NVA Regt.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Immediate deployment of IPW teams to points of VC capture, enhances the timeliness of information gained and negates the possibility of false or misleading information gained by untrained interrogators.

(2) Enemy forces in the area are better supplied and bolder than those encountered in other parts of the II Corps area. They are more prone to stand and fight and will readily reinforce and engage unit. This was displayed when C 2/502 encountered a reinforced VC platoon which was subsequently supported by a battalion size force.

(3) North Vietnamese map coverage of the operational area should be provided to IPW teams and front line battalions. Frequently captives can read their own maps when they cannot read ours.

(4) Trail studies verified by ground reports should be developed for the Brigade's own use and other US, ARVN and PAVN units.

(5) Aggressive visual reconnaissance flown by the 219th Avn Co provided information on enemy activity throughout the TIRON. In 145 hours of visual reconnaissance flown, 240 significant sightings were reported to the S-2. This has proved to be an excellent method of gathering intelligence information while units are in major conflict.

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Inclosure 1 (PL 34-74-1) List of Major Forces in Hantan Province  
to Inclosure 2 (Infill Lines) to Current Operations after Action Report,  
Operation HANTANG

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUM. WEAP.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVALUATION</u>
24th NVA Regt	Unlocated	800	-- --	Confirmed
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1752	(200)	16 Jun	"
U/I Dn 24th	ZB 1455	(200)	16 Jun	"
U/I Dn 24th	ZB 1924	(200)	22 Jun	"
88th NVA Regt	YB 8535	1200	16 Jun	Unconf Prob
VNC Co	YD 9613	100	24 May	Unconfirmed
303D NVA Infil Grp	ZI 2210	200	15 Jun	"
303E NVA Infil Grp	AS 8305	100	15 Jun	"
2 VNC Cos	ZB 1312	160	10 Jun	"
U/I Dn	ZD 1409	200	14 Jun	"

2-1-1


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Inclosure 2 (Com. situation, Disposition, and Strength of the 24th NVA Regt)  
to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation HAWK'S BAY.

1. (C) Composition:



304 DIV - Code name - CONG TRUONG 6

24th Regt - Code name - CONG TRUONG SA BINH

1st Bn - K-4  
2nd Bn - K-5  
3rd Bn - K-6

Prior to infiltration 24th Regt, designated 42, infiltrated as 6th Regiment, and now established as 24th NVA Regiment, 304th Division

2. (C) Disposition: 24th Regt, located in Kontum Province, with one battalion north of Tu Moc and two battalions southwest of Tu Moc via ZB 1225.

3. (C) Strength: The 24th Regt, 304th NVA Div (IRW) has an actual T&E strength of about 2000 personnel. It is estimated to be approximately 50% strength at present time. Total NVA losses as a result of Operation HAWK'S BAY were approximately 1000.

RECON  
SECURITY GUARD

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4. (C) Tactics: The RVN plan to attack Dak To was a three phase plan to be in during the monsoon season.

Phase I. To penetrate the mountain villages and strategic hideout, to cut communications along Hwy #14, and to prepare ambushes along Hwy #14 (Dak To - Tuy Kien).

Phase II. To neutralize emergency roads by coordinating with friendly units of NVA, Truong Son and other local troops (?) in order to encircle Dak To (Mimicking the tactics used in the Da Co plan); to tire the defensive forces by keeping constant pressure on them, forcing a withdrawal, and thus preparing an attack on the reinforcing column.

Phase III. When the monsoon rains become too heavy for the Air Force to resupply the defenses, the VC will close in and capture Dak To.

5. (C) Training:

a. VC training area located YA 962816.

b. Training of the North Vietnamese soldier:

(1) Infantry training: The basis of all instruction for the NVA soldier is Infantry. Personnel of all arms receive infantry training, including guerrilla and infiltration tactics. Emphasis is placed upon natural and artificial obstacles, and effective individual marksmanship. Experimentation is encouraged for solving tactical problems.

(2) Artillery training: Both tactical and technical training is covered. Mortars are considered artillery. Due to low literacy technical training is limited.

(3) Technical services training generally is performed "OJT".

6. (C) Logistics:

a. Installations:

YA 629827	Poss commo/liaison and supply point
YD 659400	Prob str. c and rice area
YA 637754	Poss supply storage and VC rest area
YD 930160	Susp VC base area
YB 909372	Poss supply point
AS 795255	Poss rice and grainary storage
AS 830255	Poss way station
AS 815383	Poss supply point
AS 979439	Camp
YA 962816	Training area
ZD 130500	PW camp
YA 729053	Hospital
YA 667485	Company sized rest area
YD 8644	Rice storage

Across Cambodian Border:

YA 565676	Ordnance
YA 570596	Ordnance
YA 729053	Hospital
YA 600811	Border crossing point
YA 660670	Commo/liaison station
YA 531635	Poss border crossing point
YD 659503	Billeting and storage

b. Poor transportation and lack of resources constitutes a slow system of resupply and consequently the troops receive a minimal amount of food and clothing. Ammunition makes the heaviest demands upon the supply services.

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**a. NVA Infrastruct 18 Jan 66**

2 sets uniforms (dark)  
1 pair of nylon fl. r. trousers (over 2 meters)  
1 rifle  
1 air raid siren  
1 hat  
1 canteen  
1 belt  
1 bowl, 1 spoon

7. (C) Combat Efficiency: Morale is low due to personnel losses, lack of food and medicines, and fear of combat. Combat effectiveness: 24th NVA Regt can be considered ineffective until replacements or reinforcements can be attained.

**b. (C) Miscellaneous:**

a. Infiltration: 24th Regiment code name SONG CAU Group. This infiltration group was divided into numerous small segments. The time lag between each element was two days march. 30 November 1965 a departure ceremony was held and the first element departed, and arrived in Kontum Province 23 June 1966. Recon platoon went ahead to locate Regimental position.

1st Element: 4th Bn, medical company, 19th Transportation Company and Recon platoon.

2nd Element: 5th Bn, numerous subordinate units and Regimental Headquarters element.

3rd Element: 6th Bn, remaining subordinate units and Regimental HQs.

**b. Personalities:**

Regt CO	Maj THIEN
Regt XO	Maj HUNG
4th Bn CO	Sr Capt NHOUQ
XO	Capt VAY
PC	Sr Capt CUCNG
1st Co CO	Lt KHLET
XO	Lt DAI
PC	Lt MAN
APO	Lt DAO
2nd Co CO	BUI VAN PHON
4th Co PO	Lt Y
5th Bn CO	Capt TRUNG
XO	Capt NINH
PO	Capt AN
APO	TRUNG
6th Co CO	Lt DUOC
7th Co CO	Lt HA
8th Co CO	Lt LICH
10th Co CO	Lt NOI
6th En CO	CHU BAN TAN
XO	MINTH
PO	HO LUNG

**c. Weapons in an NVA Battalion:**

TYPE	NUMBER:
75mm DKZ	4
82mm DKP	4
12.7 MG	9
7.62 MG	4
AK-47	For Infantry
SKS	
RPG-2 ML	1 per squad
Grenades	2 per individual


The above is an estimate of weapons type and number throughout the 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions, 24th NVA Regt, 304th Div.

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
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
INCLOSURE 3 (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE I, 2-6 JUNE 1968)  
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,  
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



INCLOSURE 4 A (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 7-10 JUNE 1966)  
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,  
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



ENCLOSURE 4 E(OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 10-15 JUNE 1966)  
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,  
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



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Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation H.A.N.G.M.

1. (C) COMBAT LOGISTICS:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control of Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into command, operations, communications, and movement control sections.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigger section and an explosive ordnance Disposal Team.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, and a recovery and contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment (F F D) Nha Trang Support Command accompanied the Brigade from CoEC REG to DAK TO. It was replaced by Forward Support Detachment (F S D) QUI NHON Support Command. This Forward Support Detachment (FSD) was collocated with Supply Company, Support Battalion, and was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units. The FSD was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation even though the consumption rates and usage factors, particularly in Class III and V, were far above average on several occasions. When aerial resupply proved unable to meet all requirements, overland resupply was effected promptly and efficiently. The Deputy Commander, QUI NHON Support Command, visited the Support Battalion (Fwd) almost daily, and was instrumental in providing the excellent support received.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two airmobile companies and CV-2 aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations. The CV-2 aircraft were used to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area. Aircraft sorties allocated were not sufficient to support the logistics plan on all occasions due primarily to large numbers of replacements and returnees transported to and from the forward area.

(3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 147th Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

(4) 498th Aviation Company: Provided medical aeroevacuation throughout the operation.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 107 short tons of B rations and 70 tons of Meals Combat Individual Type C were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "B" rations were received and "A" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement every meal of B rations. However, fresh vegetables were not supplied and fresh fruit and bread were extremely limited.

(2) Class II & IV: Class II & IV supplies were shipped from Brigade Support Center in Plei Me and QUI NHON area Support Command. The following items were received in greater quantities than

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normal: Batteries (BA 386, BA 30), concertina wire, sand bags, poncho liners, and insect repellent.

(3) Class III: 106 tons of Class III and IIIA were issued during the operation (excluding JP-4), to include 36,100 gallons of 102AC, 9,750 gallons of DILSEH, and 7,110 gallons of AVGAS (115/145). Supporting aviation units used 325,800 gallons of JP-4 (955 tons).

(4) Class V: 619.5 short tons of Class V were issued during this operation of which 63 short tons were issued to elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile). The following items were in short supply during the operation:

- (a) Hand-held Flares
- (b) White Star Clusters
- (c) Green Star Clusters
- (d) White Star Parachute Flares

Tactical emergency resupply was used during the heaviest fighting to maintain the brigade basic load of 105mm Howitzer and 155mm Howitzer ammunition. The brigade requested and received an increase in the Available Supply rate from 20 rounds to 40 rounds for 105mm Howitzer ammunition during the period 6 - 12 June 1966. Two lots of 105mm Howitzer ammunition were suspended. The Brigade and Forward Support Detachment, Qui Nhon Area Support Command had a total of 4100 rounds of ammunition on hand that were suspended.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at TAN CANG using one 600 GPM Erdalator initially, replacing it with a 1500 GPM Erdalator airlifted from MACV HQG.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 56 automotive, 117 signal, 94 armament, 16 instrument, 2 quartermaster and 21 engineer job orders. All but 3 signal, 4 engineer and 2 quartermaster jobs were completed. The shortage of spare parts for generators noted in previous reports still exists.

c. Ground Transportation: A total of one hundred and seventy 2½ ton truck requirements were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 73 sorties for a total of 1,215 passengers and 106.6 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Throughout the operation both UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters proved invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D were placed in direct support of the Infantry Battalions and proved to be an extremely efficient method of providing tactical and administrative support to the units. The use of the CH-47 reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the UH-1D and released the UH-1D's for support of tactical operations.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 392.18 short tons of supplies in the forward area. Attached at Inclosure I is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation HAWTHORNE.

e. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company, an element of the QUI NHON Area Support Command.

(2) R. R.: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit in the DMZ TO area.

(3) Laundry: An inoperable laundry unit was initially deployed to the area of operation. Upon receipt of necessary repair

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# CONTINENTAL

parts, the unit was repaired and the Brigade received excellent service for the remainder of the operation.

## 3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and units areas required command emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standards, however, health and hygiene remained excellent considering the operational environment. Two official Evacuation Helicopters, not equipped with winch, were made available to the Brigade. These proved unsatisfactory for extraction of seriously wounded personnel from mountainous or heavily forested terrain. Therefore, a request was made, and honored, for two Air Force CH-46 (Huskies) and two Marine CH-46 helicopters for this purpose.

### b. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA	212
(2) Non-Battle Injury	172
(3) Disease	331 (7 Malaria)
Total Treated	715

c. Returned to duty 420

d. Evacuated to hospital 202

e. Remain in holding 13

f. Hospitalized personnel (battle injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

(1) Head	30
(2) Chest	10
(3) Upper extremities	68
(4) Lower extremities	81
(5) Abdomen	6
(6) Back	17
TOTAL	212

## 4. SUMMARY:

a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Detachment, QUI NHCN Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Common supply points were used for Class I, III, and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.

b. The Brigade made extensive use of the CH-47 helicopter for resupply. It proved a substantial increase in carrying capacity over that of UH-1D and therefore reduced time required for aerial resupply.

c. Water supply in the DAF TO area was a problem initially because the 600 GPH Erdalator did not function properly. A truck mounted 1500 GPH Erdalator was dismantled, brought forward from PHAN RANG and reassembled. This equipment proved a trouble free, completely adequate supply of water.

d. Hoist helicopters: Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain has placed increased reliance upon medical evacuation aircraft with a hoist capability.

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5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Duplication of effort reduced by collocating the Area Forward Support Detachment with the organic Forward Support Element.
- b. Plans for provision of MEDEVAC helicopters with a hoist capability must be made prior to an operation.
- c. CH-47 Helicopters are invaluable in aerial resupply operations.

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Organic and Supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.
- b. Provisions be made for MEDEVAC helicopters with a hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.
- c. CH-47 Helicopters be made available for resupply missions during future operations.

1 Incl  
Air Resupply Data - Operation HAWTHORNE

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Inclosure 1 (Air Resupply Data - Operation Iraqi Curve) to Inclosure 5  
(Logistics) to After Action Report Operation Iraqi Curve

	CLASS I		CLASS II		MISC & WATER	
	POUNDS	S-TONS	POUNDS	S-TONS	POUNDS	S-TONS
2 Jun	1,000	.50	10,000	5.00	2,500	1.25
3 Jun	1,500	.75	10,000	5.00	2,000	2.00
4 Jun	--	--	59,000	29.50	--	--
5 Jun	700	.35	30,000	15.00	350	.18
6 Jun	2,900	1.45	1,250	.62	4,250	2.12
7 Jun	1,200	.60	72,700	36.35	300	.15
8 Jun	900	.45	30,600	15.30	--	--
9 Jun	1,500	.75	27,000	13.50	4,300	2.15
10 Jun	6,000	3.00	6,400	3.20	150	.08
11 Jun	9,550	4.77	10,730	5.11	6,580	3.29
12 Jun	10,975	5.49	46,490	23.24	7,050	3.52
13 Jun	10,950	5.47	49,020	24.51	8,330	4.16
14 Jun	8,850	4.42	39,190	18.55	8,950	4.47
15 Jun	12,950	6.47	64,950	32.47	6,860	3.43
16 Jun	8,150	4.07	69,090	34.54	7,310	3.65
17 Jun	6,850	3.47	49,930	21.96	8,680	4.34
18 Jun	5,850	2.92	33,750	16.87	8,000	4.00
19 Jun	5,050	2.52	4,250	2.12	5,630	2.81
20 Jun	500	.25	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	95,375	47.70	607,850	302.84	81,240	41.60

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Inclosure 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action, Operation HAWTHORPE

1. (C) Background:

Operation HAWTHORPE was conducted in the area north of DAIR TO, to disrupt and destroy NVA elements believed to be in the area. The Brigade signal elements provided the command communications for the Brigade and terminated the systems provided by the Corps signal units.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - The Brigade VHF was not committed until 12 June, when one system was installed to the Artillery Forward FDC. This system provided telephone communications to the forward artillery elements and also to adjacent infantry units.

b. Communications Center Section - A secure teletype circuit was operated between the Brigade and I FORCE V. This was supplemented by secure radio teletype circuits to HU THANG, TUY HOA, THIEN HUONG; and during the initial phases of the operation, CHIENG KHO and PISIKU.

c. Switchboard and Wire Sections - The wire section laid a total of 56 miles of wire, 12 miles in the Brigade Command Post complex and 44 miles in long lines. All Command Post lines were undergrounded and all long lines overheaded. The switchboard terminated 62 common user circuits and an additional 12 solo user circuits were installed. This system provided telephone service to all units and facilities in the area and long distance trunks in the Corps area system.

d. FM Radio Section - Operated two FM Nets to reduce the traffic on the Operation Intelligence Net. Used automatic retransmission FM relay station at TOU MO LONG vicinity coordinates ZB 138357.

e. Maintenance Section - The number of TT-4 teletypewriters in support maintenance have become critical.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Shortage of replacement personnel in the Wire, Switchboard, and Communication Center Sections is a serious problem. Communication Center personnel are especially critical because of the security clearance requirements.

b. Power surges on VHF equipment burned out components of two MII/CCC-3 Telephone Carrier Terminals and burned out several complete sets of fuses in the AN/MRC-68 Terminals. The unreliability of the RT-75 Generators on hand is causing many problems. Only one of the twelve 3KW AC Generators placed on a priority requisition in November 1965 has been issued.

Improper siting of the VHF terminal at the forward artillery location caused several system cutages. Closer coordination with supported units stressing the importance of proper siting will be made on future operations.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. When there are a large number of attachments to the Brigade, a second Operation Intelligence Net will reduce traffic on the primary Operation Intelligence Net, thus improving operations. This second net can be operated on the Command Net frequency.

b. When an automatic retransmission FM relay station is being used during an operation and it is located in a central location, it should remain at this location throughout operations in the area to insure adequate communications to the combat elements.

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Inclosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation  
WINTER COLD

1. (U) Public Information:

a. The following civilian news correspondents visited the Brigade:

- (1) David Snell - ABC News Team.
- (2) Ron Headford - ABC News Team.
- (3) Frank Rady - ABC News Team.
- (4) Keyes Dooh - Chicago Daily News.
- (5) Charles Mohr - New York Times.
- (6) Al Chang - Associated Press.
- (7) Mr. Young Ghoul - NBC News.
- (8) Warren Bosworth - Dallas Times Herald.
- (9) Max Mancay - CBS News.
- (10) Leon Daniel - UPI.
- (11) Udo Nesch - CBS News Team.
- (12) Bill Stout - CBS News Team.
- (13) Claudi Bellenger - CBS News Team.
- (14) William J. Cook - Newsweek.
- (15) Ian Dredie - London Daily Express.
- (16) Steve Van Meter - UPI.
- (17) Jack Beard - Stars and Stripes.
- (18) Howard Tuckner - NBC News Team.
- (19) Vo Huynh - NBC News Team.
- (20) Vi Gice - NBC News Team.
- (21) Bill Roilly - UPI (audio).
- (22) Art Zich - Time Magazine.
- (23) Paul Herrell - Atlanta Journal.
- (24) Bill Bowles - Charleston News and Courier.
- (25) Rick Morrison - AP.
- (26) Don Marion - AP.
- (27) Neill Mickey - TV Europa.
- (28) Francis Fullmer - UPI.
- (29) Ward Just - Washington Post.

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Inclosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation  
WINTON

(30) Dean Drayless - NBC News Team.

(31) Schindler - NBC News Team.

(32) Siguiki - NBC News Team.

(33) Vo Sun - NBC News Team.

(34) Brig Gen (Ret) G. L. A. Marshall - Novelist.

b. The following military correspondents visited the Brigade:

(1) Sgt. Kreddo - IAV.

(2) Sgt. Wallace - MCW-IO.

c. Major publicity was obtained concerning the Brigade's activities to include all Television Networks, wire services, and news magazines throughout the Free World.

d. Ward Just (Washington Post) was wounded by grenade fragments while with the 1/327th Tiger Force and was evacuated to HMC TRNG.

e. The Information Office obtained electrical lighting and a press tent during this operation.

f. Photographic processing was improved through the use of the MCW dark room.

2. (U) Command Information.

a. The receipt and distribution of command information newspapers continued to be generally late. This is a problem under continuous study for improvement.

b. The Diplomat & Marrier was published by letterpress for the first time during Operation WINTON.

c. (U) Summary. Public exposure of the Brigade continued to improve with a significant increase in the percentage of copy released and subsequently printed.

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation HAVE ONCE

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological Warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation HAVE ONCE

c. Leaflets: A total of 6,675,000 leaflets of the types indicated were dropped on the dates shown.

Date	Method	Number	Type
2 June	C-47	20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		120,000	28th Special
		130,000	Eagle Strike
		20,000	NVA
		20,000	Weapons Reward
		15,000	Chieu Hoi
4 June	C-47	20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		40,000	Eagle Strike
		120,000	NVA
		40,000	28th Regt Special
5 June	C-47	600,000	Chieu Hoi
6 June	U-10	50,000	Chieu Hoi
		50,000	Weapons Reward
		100,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		80,000	Chieu Hoi
		20,000	Chieu Hoi
		20,000	Safe Conduct Passes
8 June	U-10	60,000	Chieu Hoi
9 June	U-10	200,000	Eagle Strike
		660,000	Chieu Hoi
		40,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		60,000	Air Superiority
		60,000	Weapons Reward
		40,000	Chieu Hoi
10 June	U-10	40,000	Demoralization
		31	
11 June	U-10	40,000	

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation NMFT U-10

13 June	U-10 & UMK-10	20,000 150,000 120,000 70,000 20,000	E-52 Strike Chieu Hoi Demoralization Eagle Strike Safe Conduct Pass
14 June	U-10	40,000 20,000 45,000	Chieu Hoi Eagle Strike Demoralization
15 June	U-10	40,000 350,000 50,000	Du Co Poen Chieu Hoi NM
16 June	U-10	80,000 120,000 140,000	Chieu Hoi Demoralization NM
17 June	U-10 C-47	80,000 300,000 300,000	NM Chieu Hoi Demoralization
18 June	C-47  U-10	200,000 200,000 200,000 40,000 40,000	Demoralization Eagle Strike NM 24th Regt Special Demoralization
19 June	C-47  U-10	200,000 200,000 100,000 100,000 25,000	Chieu Hoi Eagle Strike Du Co Poen Chieu Hoi Du Co Poen Eagle Strike
20 June	U-10	10,000 200,000 50,000	Du Co Poen Chieu Hoi Eagle Strike

b. Loudspeaker: A total of 25 hours 45 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts were flown by USAF U-10, and C-47 aircraft on 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20th of June. The theme of all broadcasts was Chieu Hoi and demoralization. A total of three special times were used during the operation.

c. Summary: Two personalized, specialized, and localized leaflets and three special times were directed toward enemy units in the operational area (Inclosure 1 and 2). It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing date of the operation, a total of four regiments had surrendered themselves to Brigade personnel.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) When new leaflets are produced, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included, as a matter of course. These copies will be used as handouts to "NM" visitors.

(2) Leaflet boxes should be coated with some water resistant substance i.e. plastic, wax, etc., etc., and more securely bound as a greater protection against inclement weather.

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,  
Operation "WINTER '72"

(3) An example of contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the mount and general classification (Chiou Wei, demoralization, reward, etc, etc).

(4) The Psychological Operations Officer should have a comprehensive up to date catalogue of leaflets available to him.

(5) An augmentation to the Brigade of one Psy War school trained officer and two NCO's has been approved and personnel should be requisitioned and assigned on an expedited basis.

(6) The U-10 aircraft should be stationed at the Brigade CP.

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Inclusion 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation  
"UNIFORM"

1. (C) Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 220th Artillery DS of 1st  
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. "D" Battery, 1st Battalion (Cave) 20th  
Artillery reinforces 2d Battalion (Airborne), 220th Artillery.

2. (C) Execution:

a. On 2 June B1/30 Arty displaced from ZD040227 at 0100 hrs to  
ZD059309 closing at 1530 hrs in support of operation by 1/327 Inf. At  
022015 hrs B1/30's perimeter received light probe resulting in one (1) VC  
T-54 (C). There were no friendly casualties.

b. On 3 June Btry D displaced from ZD040227 by CM-47 starting at  
1037 hrs. Btry used 13 sorties; cleared ZD090346 at 1930 hrs. Btry D by fired  
3 registrations, 28 targets of opportunity, 43 marking missions, 11 crew  
illumination missions, 15 preparations, 16 defensive concentrations, 3  
screeching missions, 350 VCI targets in support of 1/327 Inf and 2/52 Inf.

c. On 4 June B1/30 Arty displaced by road to ZD064344 starting at  
1400 hrs and closing at 0045 hrs to reinforce the fires of Btry D in support  
of 1/327 Inf. In this position B1/30 Arty fired 61 missions expending 115  
rounds reinforcing the fires of Btry D.

d. On 6 June B1/30 Arty displaced to ZD014216 by road starting at  
1515 hrs and closing at 1725 hrs.

e. At 0200 hrs 7 June Btry D was attacked by an estimated battalion  
of the North Vietnamese Army. One platoon of B1/30 Arty displaced to  
ZD041227 at 0407 hrs where they fired 199 rounds in support of the defense of  
Btry D. This battle continued until 0445 hrs when the enemy broke contact.  
Friendly losses were 3 T-54, 21 VCI, 1 - M102 Mortar destroyed, 1 - M151  
destroyed, 3 - 2½-ton trucks destroyed, 3 - 9 normic telescopes damaged, 1 -  
M-2 firing circle destroyed, and 1 M-70-46 radio destroyed. Enemy losses  
were 36 T-54 (C), 11 - Chi Com grenades, 5 - M26 grenades, 4 rocket launchers,  
and 3 M-16 rifles. At 0801 hrs Btry C displaced to ZD002416 closing at 0900  
hrs to reinforce further support to the defenses of Btry D. At 1115 hrs B1/30  
Arty (-) displaced to ZD060236 clearing at 1145 hrs to reinforce fires of  
Btry C.

f. On 8 June B1/30 Arty displaced to ZD090346 by road starting at  
1025 hrs and closing at 1500 hrs to reinforce fires of Btry C. Btry A moved  
to ZD090246 by road starting at 1007 hrs and closing at 1905 hrs. In this  
position B1/30 Arty fired 3 registrations, 11 preparations, 3 illumination  
missions, 18 targets of opportunity and 210 VCI missions. Btry A fired 3  
registrations, 16 marking missions, 20 targets of opportunity, 6 illumination  
missions, 4 preparations, 8 defensive concentrations, 1 screeching mission,  
and 106 VCI's.

g. At 130100 hrs task force 1/327 Arty was formed and given the  
additional missions of providing security and convoy escort on Route UNIFORM.  
The task force consisted of the 1/320th Arty, B1/30 Arty, 1 OPIG company,  
2 platoons 12/17 Cav, and 1 platoon 1/25 Inf. The route was initially  
secured by using strong points along the route manned by the CIDG company.  
On 12 June a mine was discovered on the route, and it was determined that  
better route security could be provided by indirect fire. From 12 June until  
20 June the route was secured during darkness by a heavy VCI program. There  
were no mining incidents after 12 June.

h. On 19 June Btry A displaced to ZD041227 at 1255 hrs.

i. On 20 June Btry D and B1/30 Arty displaced to ZD040246 closing  
at 1040 hrs and 1037 hrs respectively.

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Enclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation  
WATERTOWER.

3. (C) Supply and Administration: Originally the batteries deployed with (3) days rations and a basic load of class V. Batteries were resupplied both by convoy and helicopter throughout due to the tactical situation.

4. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Security of main supply routes: In the initial phase of the operation, TF 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was formed and consisted of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery Battalion, one CIBG company, two Cavalry platoons, and one Engineer platoon. The mission of the attached elements was to provide security for the battalion firing position and to provide security along the resupply route from Dak To to the battalion firing position. After a mining incident on the resupply route it was decided to pull all of the security elements in around the battalion firing positions every night and to secure the road at night with a heavy program of VT fuzed M1 fires. This scheme proved to be very effective for it not only prevented future mining incidents, but also allowed for greater security of the firing positions.

b. Security of Battery Firing Positions: It was found during this operation that a very close perimeter defense is essential to battery security. The perimeter should be far enough from the firing positions to prevent hand grenades from reaching the gun crews and yet close enough to permit a high degree of control of the perimeter forces in order to facilitate direct artillery fire against the enemy. During the NVA attack on B Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, the inability to locate the infantry security elements prevented the use of the Bochive round. It is recommended that the security elements with the artillery be placed under the operational control of the artillery commander.

c. Team Air, Artillery, Infantry Coordination: As in past operations of the complexity of this operation, unnecessary lulls in the firing of artillery and Team Air occurred. This can be attributed to many factors, some of which are: lack of control by the ground force commander, poor timing on the part of the artillery FO, mission saturation of the artillery FO, and communication difficulties. Upon completion of this operation all artillery LIO's, FO's and the artillery S-3 were assembled and this problem was discussed in detail. A detailed list of causes and recommended solutions is being prepared for discussion with all personnel concerned.

d. Mishandling of Artillery Ammunition: This is a subject that requires constant command supervision. Ammunition handlers, if not properly supervised, will damage ammunition. Helicopter lifts to resupply firing batteries are particularly damaging to ammunition because of the speed with which loading and unloading must be accomplished. Damaged ammunition could be the cause of some of the muzzle bursts that have occurred in RVN.

5. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Pull all of the security elements in and around the artillery firing positions at night and secure the area around the positions with heavy M1 fires.

b. It was found that by covering main supply routes with VT on the road and quick (Q) on the sides of the road, main supply routes were more rapidly opened in the morning.

c. Surface movement: Only one battery displacement during the entire operation was made by helicopter. All other displacements were overland moves. It was learned that by using the available few vehicles within this battalion, Support B battalion, ARVN units and the attached 155 mm moves

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Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation  
WANTONIE

that all batteries could be moved overland expeditiously and without incident.  
The conclusion is that it is not necessary for this battalion to have prime  
rovers for each howitzer as it was originally believed.

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Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 9 Recap of Positions occupied and missions fired:

A Battery

30 May - 8 June 1966

POSITION: ZB041227	Total No Man's: 63
Conducted: 55 H&I	Expended: 284 HEQ
2 Reg	2 HC
3 MK/rds	33 WP
3 Targets of Opportunity	

8 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: ZB090346	Total No Man's: 256
Conducted: 186 H&I	Expended: 5,789 HEQ
3 Reg	246 HEVT
16 MK/rds	43 HET
30 Targets of Opportunity	64 WP
6 II/I Man's	43 III
6 Props	110 HC
9 DF Conc	6 Yellow Smoke
1 Screening Msn	

B Battery

30 May - 3 June 1966

POSITION: ZB014218	Total No Man's: 135
Conducted: 112 H&I	Expended: 606 HEQ
3 Reg	42 HEVT
13 MK/rds	2 WP
7 Targets of Opportunity	15 Yellow smoke
	4 HC

4 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: ZB089347	Total No Man's: 490
Conducted: 361 H&I	Expended: 6,738 HEQ
3 Reg	228 HEVT
43 MK/rds	17 HET
11 III	124 WP
15 Prep	186 HC
16 DF Conc	180 III
3 Screening Man's	2 Yellow Smoke
38 Targets of Opportunity	2 Red Smoke

C Battery

1 June - 7 June 1966

POSITION: ZB015218	Total No Man's: 79
Conducted: 66 H&I	Expended: 776 HEQ
3 Reg	3 WP
9 MK/rds	7 Yellow Smoke

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Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 9 Recap of Positions occupied and missions fired:

C. P. 1100Z

7 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: Z3030230	Total No Msn's: 381
Conducted: 299 WAI	Expended: 2,752 'TQ
2 Reg	145 ENT
15 MI/rds	77 'P
3 ILL	20 ILL
13 DF Conc	16 'C
19 Prop	11 Yellow Smoke
30 Targets of Opportunity	1 Green Smoke

3/1/20

30 May - 1 June 1966

POSITION: Z3040227	Total No Msn's: 77
Conducted: 67 WAI	Expended: 329 'TQ
	12 'P
	4 'C
	2 ILL

5 June - 5 June 1966

POSITION: Z3059309	Total No Msn's: 61
Conducted: 58 WAI	Expended: 103 'TQ
	1 'P
	7 Smoke

7 June 1966

POSITION: Z3014210	Total No Msn's: 19
Conducted: 18 WAI	Expended: 199 'TQ

7 June - 8 June 1966

POSITION: Z3010233	Total No Msn's: 13
Conducted: 11 WAI	Expended: 175 'TQ
	3 'P

8 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: Z3090346	Total No Msn's: 245
Conducted: 210 WAI	Expended: 4,534 'TQ
3 Reg	12 'P
11 Prop	3 'C
3 ILL	48 ILL
13 Targets of Opportunity	

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